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Abstract
This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters
(2005) supporting their deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characteri-
zation result. We also provide the remedy, a modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition, to rescue
the characterization.
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1 Introduction
Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) presents the concept of the Weak Sequential Core and
its characterization for dynamic TU games without uncertainty. The main idea is that
coalitions can only deviate from a given allocation if this deviation is credible; i.e. there
is no sub-coalition at any date who can further improve upon it. Our focus here will be a
reformulation of the idea of credibility.
By means of an example we argue that there is a problem in the argument of Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core. We also
provide a remedy, a modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition, to rescue their results.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We specify the setup of the dynamic TU-game in
Section 2. Next we provide the deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core following Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005) in Section 3. We proceed with showing the problem with this
deﬁnition in Section 4 and providing a remedy to it in Section 5.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the basic deﬁnitions and the setting of the game played.
A TU-game is a pair (N,w), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and w : 2N →
R is a characteristic function which assigns to each coalition C ⊂ N its worth w(C), with
the convention that w(∅) = 0. The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by G.
We consider a sequence of TU-games, played in time-periods t ∈ T = {1, . . . , T}, by
the players in N . Now the characteristic function wt : 2
N → R assigns to each coalition
C ⊂ N in each time-period t its worth wt(C), with wt(∅) = 0. Each player i ∈ N
has an intertemporal utility function, ui : RT → R which assigns to every payoﬀ stream
xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
T ) ∈ RT of player i a utility level ui(xi). A dynamic TU-game is therefore
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A dynamic TU-game, denoted by Γ, is a tuple (N, T , w, u), where w =
(w1, . . . , wT ) and u = (u
1, . . . , un).
The utility function ui is assumed to be continuous, weakly increasing in each coordi-
nate, time-separable, and satisﬁes
lim
xit→−∞
ui(x¯i\xit) = −∞, (1)
where x¯i\xit denotes the allocation where the period-t component of the allocation x¯i is
replaced by xit.
The distribution of worth if the grand-coalition is formed is called an allocation; x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RT ×N . The period-t component of the allocation is xt = (x1t , . . . , xnt ) ∈ RN .
We introduce some useful notation to be able to deﬁne the subgame of a dynamic TU-
game. Let t+ ⊂ T denote the set of time-periods from t onwards, so t+ = {t, . . . , T}. An
allocation stream in time-periods from t onwards is denoted xt+ , and player i’s payoﬀ stream
is xit+ . Similarly, we use the notation for the characteristic function; wt+ = (wt, . . . , wT ).
We will use the following property of the utility functions. Since every utility function
is assumed to be time-separable, there is a utility function uit : R
t+ → R for each period t
such that for every (xi1, . . . , x
i
t−1) and every pair y
i
t+ , y˜
i
t+ we have
ui(xi1, . . . , x
i
t−1, y
i
t+) ≥ ui(xi1, . . . , xit−1, y˜it+)
if and only if
uit(y
i
t+) ≥ uit(y˜it+).
Let ut denote the utility functions ut = (u
i
t)i∈N , the collection of individual utility functions
from t onwards.
Now the subgame of a dynamic TU-game can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2. The subgame of a dynamic TU-game Γ starting at time period t is the
dynamic TU-game Γt = (N, t
+, wt+ , ut+).
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For a dynamic TU-game Γ, (Γ, C) will denote the restriction of the game to coalition
C.
The central question in a TU-game is how to distribute the worth w(C) of a coalition
C among its members if the coalition is formed. An allocation for a coalition C in Γ is a
matrix xC = (xi)i∈C ∈ RT ×C . The allocation for a coalition C at time-period t is xCt ∈ RC
and an allocation stream for coalition C in time-periods from t onwards is denoted xCt+ .
The total amount of payoﬀ of coalition C in time-period t is xt(C) =
∑
i∈C x
i
t, where x
i
t
is player i’s share. The total payoﬀ stream for the coalition from t onwards is denoted by
xt+(C).
Deﬁnition 2.3. An allocation x¯ ∈ RT ×N is eﬃcient in the game Γ if
x¯(N) = w(N).
Note that this concept says more than the usual eﬃciency or feasibility conditions in
TU games, since it requires
∑
i∈N x
i
t = wt(N) to hold for all time-periods t ∈ T .
We study which allocations are stable in a game Γ. In general, a given allocation x¯
is stable if there is no time-period t ∈ T and no coalition C ⊂ N which has a proﬁtable
deviation from x¯ at time-period t. There are various ways in which the notion of proﬁtable
deviation might be formulated. Here we concentrate on proﬁtable deviations related to the
Weak Sequential Core.
3 The Weak Sequential Core
In this section we reproduce the deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core following Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005).
Deﬁnition 3.1. An allocation xCt+ ∈ Rt
+×C is feasible for a coalition C at time-period t
in the game Γ if
xt+(C) = wt+(C).
Note again that this concept says that the allocation must be feasible for coalition C
in every time-period; it requires
∑
i∈C x
i
t′ = wt′(C) to hold for all time-periods t
′ from t
onwards.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let some allocation x¯ be given. A coalition C can deviate from x¯ at a
given time period t ∈ T if there exists a feasible allocation xCt+ for coalition C at t such
that
uit(x
i
t+) > u
i
t(x¯
i
t+), for all i ∈ C.
Since the utility functions are time-separable, the improvement in time-period t¯ is
independent of the payoﬀs received before t¯. Note also that we implicitly assume that once
a coalition deviates, it can no longer collaborate with players outside the coalition for the
rest of the time.
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Deﬁnition 3.3. A deviation xCt+ as in Deﬁnition 3.2 is credible if there is no sub-coalition
C ′ ⊂ C and time-period t′ ≥ t such that C ′ has a counter-deviation at t′ from xCt+ , i.e. a
feasible allocation stream xˆt′+ for C
′ with uit′(xˆt′+) > u
i
t′(xt′+) for all i ∈ C ′.
Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) deﬁne the Weak Sequential Core as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.4. The Weak Sequential Core of the game Γ, denoted by WSC(Γ), is the set
of feasible allocations x¯ for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible
deviation.
4 Problem with the implications of WSC(Γ)
In this section we argue that if one follows the deﬁnitions of Section 3, the results of Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005) may not hold. In particular we present a counter-example to their
ﬁrst result, Lemma 1.
First we re-state Lemma 1. Then we give an example, which proves Lemma 1 to be
incorrect.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a dynamic TU-game and x¯ a feasible allocation for N . Then the
following two statements are equivalent.
(a) x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ),
(b) x¯ is such that x¯2+ ∈ WSC(Γ2) and there is no C ⊂ N and allocation xC such that
x(C) = w(C), xC2+ ∈ WSC(Γ2, C) and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i in C.
Example 4.1. Consider a game with two time-periods and two players; T = {1, 2} and
N = {1, 2}. Let the stage games be given by
w1({1}) = 0.9, w1({2}) = 0, w1({1, 2}) = 1,
w2({1}) = 0, w2({2}) = 0.9, w2({1, 2}) = 1.
Let the utility functions be
ui(xi) = 1/2(1− e−xi1) + 1/2(1− e−xi2)
for both players.
Consider the following allocation
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
This allocation would give both players a utility of ui(x¯i) ≈ 0.3161.
It is clear that no singleton coalition can deviate from the given allocation at any time,
and also that the coalition {1, 2} cannot block x¯ at t = 2, since it is not possible to increase
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the utility of both players simultaneously. Thus it only remains to check if {1, 2} has a
credible deviation x{1,2} at t = 1. For such a deviation it must hold that
u1(x1) > u1(1, 0), (2)
u2(x2) > u2(0, 1). (3)
To prevent counter-deviations by players 1 and 2 at t = 2 it should also hold that
x12 ≥ 0, (4)
x22 ≥ 0.9. (5)
It follows from Inequality (5) and feasibility that x12 ≤ 0.1. Using Inequality (2) we ﬁnd
that
1/2(1− e−x11) + 1/2(1− e−0.1) ≥ u1(1, 0),
so, x11 ≥ 0.7699. By feasibility we obtain x21 ≤ 0.2301.
The deviation x1,2 therefore satisﬁes
u1(x1) ≤ u1(1, 0.1) ≈ 0.3636,
u2(x2) ≤ u2(0.2301, 1) ≈ 0.4188.
It follows that x{1,2} cannot be a credible deviation, since x′ deﬁned by
x′ =
(
0.455 0.545
0.455 0.545
)
is a counter-deviation for coalition {1, 2} at t = 1; u1(x′1) ≈ 0.3656 and u2(x′2) ≈ 0.4202.
Although x′ itself is not credible, player 2 can counter-deviate from it in time-period 2,
x′ makes any possible deviation by coalition {1, 2} at t = 1 not credible.
Thus the given allocation x¯ is in the Weak Sequential Core of the game.
Now we will show, by means of Example 4.1, that (a) of Lemma 1 does not imply (b).
We have seen that
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
is an element of the Weak Sequential Core, so x¯ satisﬁes the conditions in (a). It is also
clear that the ﬁrst claim of (b) holds; i.e. x¯2+ = x¯2 = (0, 1) is in the Weak Sequential
Core of the subgame starting in time-period 2. The rest of the claim however is not true.
Consider the allocation x{1,2} deﬁned by
x{1,2} =
(
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
)
.
It holds that x{1,2}({1, 2}) = w({1, 2}), x{1,2}2 ∈ WSC(Γ2, {1, 2}), u1(x1) > u1(x¯1) and
u2(x2) > u2(x¯2), so x¯ does not satisfy the conditions in (b). Thus it follows that (a) does
not imply (b).
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5 Remedy
Part (b) of Lemma 1 plays a very important role in the concept of Weak Sequential Core.
Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) take (b) of Lemma 1 to deﬁne the Weak Sequen-
tial Core in their work on exchange economies and also Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005)
think of this condition as a crucial property of the WSC(Γ).
In this section we modify the deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core. Following Def-
inition 4 in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) the authors argue that the existence of a
deviation by C ′ implies the existence of a credible counter-deviation by some coalition C ′′,
and so it is not necessary to require a counter-deviation by C ′ to be credible; supporting
both their deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core and the proof of Lemma 1.
Their argument proceeds as follows. Suppose that C ′ has a counter-deviation x′ from
xC that is not credible. One may assume that C ′ itself does not have a counter-deviation
from this deviation. Then there is a coalition C ′′  C ′ that has a deviation x′′ from x′ at
a time-period t′′ ≥ t′. Next they claim that if x′′ is a credible deviation from x′ then it is
also a credible deviation from x¯. However this claim does not hold.
Consider the counter-deviation x′ of C ′ = {1, 2} at t = 1 in Example 4.1. This devia-
tion is not credible, C ′ itself does not have a deviation from it and C ′′  C ′ = {2} does.
Player 2 could deviate in time-period 2 with x′′2 = w2({2}) = 0.9 > 0.545. However, x′′ is
not a deviation from x¯22 = 1, providing a counter-example to the claim above.
The solution to the problem is to require the counter-deviation by C ′ in Deﬁnition 3.3
to be credible at its turn. We propose to use a notion of credibility similar in spirit to the
one deﬁned by Ray (1989), applied to our dynamic setting.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Credible deviation for a singleton). Let some allocation x¯ be given. A
feasible allocation x
{i}
t+ is a deviation from x¯ for player i ∈ N in time-period t ∈ T if
uit(x
i
t+) > u
i
t(x¯
i
t+). Such a deviation is always credible for a singleton coalition.
A 2-player coalition C has a credible deviation xCt+ at time-period t if there is no
singleton sub-coalition C ′  C and time t′ ≥ t such that C ′ has a credible deviation at t′
from xCt+ . Therefore, recursively, a credible deviation for a coalition C is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Credible deviation). Let some allocation x¯ be given. A feasible allocation
xCt+ is a deviation from x¯ for coalition C in time-period t ∈ T if uit(xit+) > uit(x¯it+), for all
i ∈ C. Such an xCt+ is a credible deviation for coalition C at time-period t if there is no
sub-coalition C ′  C and time t′ ≥ t such that C ′ has a credible deviation at t′ from xCt+ .
Now the deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core can be modiﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.3. The Weak Sequential Core of the game Γ, denoted by WSC(Γ), is the set
of feasible allocations x¯ for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible
deviation.
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If one applies this modiﬁed deﬁnition of credibility to Example 4.1, x¯ deﬁned by
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
is no longer an element of the Weak Sequential Core. Consider x{1,2} deﬁned by
x{1,2} = (x1, x2) =
(
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
)
.
We claim that x{1,2} is a credible deviation from x¯ by coalition {1, 2} at t = 1. Indeed,
u1(x1) > u1(x¯1), u2(x2) > u2(x¯2), and there is no deviation possible from x{1,2} by any
singleton coalition at any time-period.
We show next that if one uses Deﬁnition 5.3 instead of Deﬁnition 3.4 to deﬁne the
Weak Sequential Core, Lemma 1 is rescued.
First we introduce two lemmas, which will be useful for our proof of Lemma 1 under
the modiﬁed deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core.
Lemma 5.4. If, for some t ∈ T , x¯t+ ∈ WSC(Γt), then it holds that x¯t′+ ∈ WSC(Γt′) for
all t′ ≥ t.
Lemma 5.4 follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core, so the
proof is omitted.
Lemma 5.5. Let x¯ be an eﬃcient allocation and let xC be a credible deviation from x¯ by
coalition C at time-period t = 1. Let D be the set of credible deviations yC from x¯ by C at
t = 1 with the property that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ C. It holds that the set D is compact.
Proof. First we show that D is closed. Consider a sequence (yCn )n∈N with y
C
n ∈ D
converging to y¯C . We need to show that y¯C ∈ D. Suppose not, i.e. y¯C /∈ D. Then either
(i) y¯C is not a credible deviation from x¯ by C at t = 1,
or
(ii) it does not hold that ui(y¯i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ C.
Clearly y¯C is a deviation from x¯ by C at t = 1, so if y¯C is not a credible deviation, then
there is a credible counter-deviation yˆC
′
t+ from y¯
C by a sub-coalition C ′  C at t ≥ 1. Since
uit(y¯
i
t+) < u
i
t(yˆ
i
t+) for all i ∈ C ′, there must be an nˆ such that if n > nˆ then for all i ∈ C ′,
uit(y
i
t+,n) < u
i
t(yˆ
i
t+). But then y
C
n cannot be a credible deviation from x¯ by C at t = 1
either, thus (i) cannot hold.
The continuity of ui implies ui(y¯i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ C, thus (ii) cannot hold. Hence,
D is closed.
Now we show that D is bounded. We deﬁne the set Dt by
Dt = {yt+ ∈ Rt+×C |yt+ is a credible deviation from x¯ by C at t}.
Notice that D ⊂ D1, since ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ C is not required for yC to belong
to D1. We use backwards induction to prove that D1 is bounded, thereby completing the
proof of the lemma.
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1. For i ∈ C and yCT ∈ DT it holds that
yiT ≥ wT ({i}),
since yiT = wT ({i}) if C = {i}, and {i} should not have a deviation from yT if
{i}  C. Furthermore, since yCT (C) = wT (C), we have
yiT ≤ wT (C)−
∑
i′ =i
wT ({i′}),
showing that DT is bounded.
2. Assume Dt+1 is bounded for some t ∈ T . Let bC and b¯C be such that bC ≤ yC(t+1)+ ≤
b¯C , for all yC(t+1)+ ∈ Dt+1. We show that Dt is bounded.
Suppose Dt is not bounded from below. Then there exists a sequence (y
C
t+,n)n∈N with
yCt+,n ∈ Dt such that, for some i ∈ C and for some t′ ≥ t,
yit′,n ≤ −n for all n ∈ N.
Since yCt+,n ∈ Dt, it follows that yC(t+1)+,n ∈ Dt+1, and so bC ≤ yC(t+1)+,n ≤ b¯C , and
therefore t′ = t. Then, given that the utility function is assumed to be time-separable
and weakly increasing in each coordinate, it holds that
uit(y
i
t+,n) ≤ uit(yit,n, b¯i). (6)
By Equation (1), we know that
lim
n→∞
uit(y
i
t,n, b¯
i) = −∞, (7)
and so by (7), we get
lim
n→∞
uit(y
i
t+,n) = −∞.
At the same time, credibility of yit+,n implies u
i
t(y
i
t+,n) ≥ uit(wt+({i})), and we obtain
a contradiction, so we have shown that Dt is bounded from below. It follows that Dt
is also bounded from above, since yt+(C) = wt+(C).

Now we prove Lemma 1, using Deﬁnition 5.3 as the deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential
Core.
Proof. (of Lemma 1)
First we show that (a) implies (b). The ﬁrst part of (b) holds as stated in Lemma 5.4.
We prove the second part by contradiction. Suppose there is C ⊂ N and xC such that
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x(C) = w(C), xC2+ ∈ WSC(Γ2, C) and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C. We show that if such
a deviation xC exists, then there also exists a credible deviation from x¯, thus contradict-
ing (a). If xC is a credible deviation, then we are done, so suppose xC is not a credible
deviation. Since xC2+ ∈ WSC(Γ2, C), for xC not being credible, there must be a credi-
ble deviation xˆC
′
from xC at time-period t = 1 by a sub-coalition C ′  C. But then xˆC
′
is also a credible deviation from x¯ at t = 1 by C ′ since ui(xˆi) > ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C ′.
We show next that (b) implies (a). Suppose (a) does not hold. Since x¯2+ ∈ WSC(Γ2)
by assumption, for x¯ /∈ WSC(Γ) to hold, there must be a credible deviation xC from x¯ by
a coalition C at t = 1. We will show that then there also exists a credible deviation y¯C
from x¯ by coalition C at t = 1 such that y¯C2+ belongs to WSC(Γ2, C), thereby violating (b).
Let D be the set of credible deviations yC from x¯ by C at t = 1 with the property that
uC(yC) ≥ uC(xC). Let y¯C be a credible deviation solving
max
yC∈D
∑
i∈C
ui(yi). (8)
Since the allocation xC belongs to D, so D is non-empty, and we know from Lemma 5.5
that D is compact, the set of maximizers in (8) is non-empty.
We show that y¯C2+ belongs to WSC(Γ2, C). Suppose y¯
C
2+ /∈ WSC(Γ2, C). Then there is
a credible deviation yˆC
′
t+ from y¯
C
2+ by C
′ ⊂ C at t ≥ 2. Since y¯C is a credible deviation, it
is not possible that C ′  C, so C ′ = C.
We show that y˜C = (y¯C1 , yˆ
C
2+) belongs to D, so
(i) ui(y˜i) ≥ ui(xi), for all i ∈ C,
(ii) y˜C is a credible deviation from x¯ by coalition C at t = 1.
Part (i) follows from the time-separability of the utility functions, since we have that
ui(y˜i) > ui(y¯i) ≥ ui(xi), for all i ∈ C.
Suppose (ii) does not hold. Since ui(y˜i) ≥ ui(xi) > ui(x¯i), for all i ∈ C, for y˜C not to
be a credible deviation from x¯, there should be a coalition C ′  C with a credible deviation
zC
′
t′+ from y˜
C at t′. This leads to a contradiction when t′ ≥ t since yˆCt+ is credible, and to a
contradiction when t′ < t since y¯C is a credible. We have shown that y˜C ∈ D. It follows
that
∑
i∈C u
i(y˜i) >
∑
i∈C u
i(y¯i), which contradicts that y¯C is a maximizer. We have shown
that y¯C2+ ∈ WSC(Γ2, C). 
6 Conclusion
The original deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core for dynamic transferable utility games
as proposed in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) is problematic since it is incompatible
with the main characterization of the Weak Sequential Core. In turn, this characterization
was used to deﬁne the Weak Sequential Core for economies with incomplete asset markets
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in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006). We propose a modiﬁcation of the original
deﬁnition under which the desired equivalence with the main characterization of the Weak
Sequential Core is rescued.
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